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Abstract If carbon capture and storage (CCS) is to become a viable option for low-carbon
power generation, its deployment will require the construction of dedicated CO2 transport
infrastructure. In a scenario of large-scale deployment of CCS in Europe by 2050, the optimal
(cost-minimising) CO2 transport network would consist of large international bulk pipelines
from the main CO2 source regions to the CO2 sinks in hydrocarbon fields and saline aquifers,
which are mostly located in the North Sea. In this paper, we use a Shapley value approach to
analyse the multilateral negotiation process that would be required to develop such jointly
optimised CO2 infrastructure. First, we find that countries with excess storage capacity cap-
ture 38–45 % of the benefits of multilateral coordination, implying that the resource rent of a
depleted hydrocarbon field (when used for CO2 storage) is roughly $1 per barrel of original
recoverable oil reserves, or $2 per boe (barrel of oil equivalent) of original recoverable gas
reserves. This adds 25–600 % to current estimates of CO2 storage cost. Second, countries with
a strategic transit location capture 19 % of the rent in the case of national pipeline monopolies.
Liberalisation of CO2 pipeline construction at EU level could eliminate the transit rent and
is shown to reduce by two-thirds the differences between countries in terms of cost per tonne
of CO2 exported. Reaching agreement on such liberalisation may be politically challenging,
since the payoffs are shown to be strongly divergent across countries.
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1 Introduction
In order to keep climate change below 2◦C, the European Council reconfirmed in February
2011 the EU objective of reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions by 80–95 % by 2050 com-
pared to 1990, in the context of necessary reductions according to the IPCC1 by developed
countries as a group. Reaching this target would require near-complete ‘decarbonisation’ of
the European power sector: based on the PRIMES EU energy system model, the EU Climate
Roadmap 2050 projects 93–99 % reduction of CO2 emissions in the power sector by 2050
compared to 1990 (European Commission 2011a).
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is one of the technological options for reducing
CO2 emissions from the power generation sector, as well as from other heavy industries. CCS
is a process consisting of the separation of CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources,
transport to a storage location (such as a depleted hydrocarbon field or a saline aquifer) and
long-term isolation from the atmosphere (see e.g. IPCC 2005). CCS could offer a bridge
between the fossil fuels dependent economy and the carbon-free future, and figures quite
prominently in EU energy and climate policies. The EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050 contains 7
scenarios up to 2050, and on average these scenarios project 133 GW of installed CCS power
generation capacity by 2050 (European Commission 2011b). Such large-scale deployment of
CCS in Europe would require the development of an extensive international pipeline network
to transport around 1 Gt/y of captured CO2 from power plants to the appropriate CO2 storage
sites.
This paper studies the multilateral strategic game between countries in their negotiations
to develop such an international CO2 pipeline network. First we estimate the magnitude of the
benefits associated with international cooperation in the development of this pipeline network,
compared to a situation in which countries take individual action. The main focus of the paper,
however, is to apply cooperative game theory to describe the strategic behaviour of countries
in the multilateral negotiations. Since the benefits from international cooperation turn out to
be large and positive, the analysis is focused on how the gains from such cooperation could
be distributed among participating countries. Equivalently, the paper answers the question
how the investment burden of an international CO2 pipeline network would be allocated
to the participating countries. In particular, we study how that allocation depends on EU
legislation for CO2 pipelines, by considering two possible policy scenarios: national pipeline
monopolies on the one hand, and full liberalisation of pipeline construction on the other hand.
It should be noted that despite the prominence of CCS in EU energy system projections, the
acceptance of CCS is still low in many countries, hence large-scale cooperation still seems
challenging. The policy relevance of this paper is first of all that it points out which monetary
transfers may be needed in order to achieve cooperation. Secondly, the paper assesses the
effect of EU CO2 pipeline regulation options on the cooperation game between European
countries.
International coordination in the construction of CO2 transport infrastructure can be very
beneficial. Indeed, since the costs of a pipeline do not scale proportionally with its trans-
port capacity, substantial cost savings can be achieved by building a backbone of large bulk
pipelines that collect CO2 from multiple sources and transport it to the main clusters of
CO2 sinks. For that reason, a communication from the European Commission (2010) empha-
sises the need for a timely start of coordinated infrastructure planning and development at
European level. The question then arises what such a European CO2 transport infrastruc-
ture would look like. Recent research has produced a number of models that are capable
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
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of determining the optimal (i.e. cost-minimising) CO2 transport network that can transport
CO2 from sources to sinks, such as Middleton and Bielicki (2009), Broek et al. (2010a,b),
Mendelevitch et al. (2010) and Morbee et al. (2010, 2012). These studies, however, do not
describe how the necessary coordination to achieve such optimal infrastructure would be
realised. The case studies investigated by e.g. Middleton and Bielicki (2009) and Broek et al.
(2010a) are focused on single countries or states, where coordination may be relatively feasi-
ble. However, the trans-European networks described by e.g. Mendelevitch et al. (2010) and
Morbee et al. (2010, 2012) require coordination and joint pipeline infrastructure investment
by a large number of countries. The question we study in this paper is how such interna-
tional cooperation could be structured in order to achieve the benefits of joint infrastructure
optimisation.
In particular, our paper aims to study how the gains from coordination can be allocated
between countries in order to ensure participation in the joint coordination. We analyse the
allocation by means of the Shapley value concept from cooperative game theory. Game
theory has already been applied to energy networks by e.g. Hobbs and Kelly (1992), who
apply cooperative models to short-run electricity transmission games and a dynamic non-
cooperative Stackelberg game to long-run electricity transmission capacity decision games.
Our model, by contrast, applies cooperative game theory to the capacity decision. Kleindor-
fer et al. (2001) provide an overview of strategic gaming in power markets, but do not focus
on transmission infrastructure. Csercsik and Koczy (2011) study transmission networks—
including expansion games—using cooperative game theory in a load flow model of the
electricity system, and apply it to a stylised 5-node network. Our analysis is less detailed
on the technical side (CO2 transmission is treated here as a simple transport model) but
the methodology is applied to an extensive European case study. As mentioned before, the
focus of our study is on allocation of the benefits of cooperation, or equivalently, alloca-
tion of the network investment cost. Again for the case of electricity, cost allocation has
been studied by e.g. Contreras and Wu (2000) and Evans et al. (2003), who use a Kernel
approach from cooperative game theory. Gately (1974) provides a game-theoretic analysis of
the distribution of the benefits of cooperation in electrical power investments between three
regions in the Southern Electricity Region of India. The study considers 5 possible partitions
of players, comprising 7 possible coalitions, and compares several game-theoretic methods
for distributing the gains from cooperation, with Shapley value and Kernel as some of the
possible options. Our model, by contrast, needs to consider a more complex game with 18
players, hence 262,143 possible coalitions and 682 billion possible partitions. As a result,
our analysis of the strategic game is less extensive, and considers only the Shapley value as a
possible allocation. As is well-known, the Shapley value is an approach for ‘fair’ allocation
of gains from cooperation among participating actors. It has been applied to natural gas by
e.g. Hubert and Ikonnikova (2009) and Ikonnikova and Zwart (2010), and to CO2 emissions
by e.g. Albrecht et al. (2002). In the context of CO2 pipeline networks, the Shapley value can
determine the bargaining power of individual countries in the international negotiation on
CO2 infrastructure investment, and hence the allocation of the cost burden. The bargaining
power of each country, and hence its share of the benefits from cooperation, depends on how
easily the country can be circumvented. As can be intuitively expected, countries with large
storage potential or a strategic transit position are likely to receive large net benefits from
the negotiation, while countries with large excess CO2 quantities (i.e. CO2 captured which
cannot be stored domestically) make a net contribution.
The results of the analysis are twofold. First, we find that countries with excess stor-
age capacity capture 38–45 % of the benefits of multilateral coordination, implying that the
resource rent of a depleted hydrocarbon field (when used for CO2 storage) is roughly $1
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per barrel of original recoverable oil reserves, or $2 per boe (barrel of oil equivalent) of
original recoverable gas reserves. This adds 25–600 % to current estimates of CO2 storage
cost. Second, countries with a strategic transit location capture 19 % of the rent in the case of
national pipeline monopolies. Liberalisation of CO2 pipeline construction at EU level could
eliminate the transit rent and is shown to reduce by two-thirds the differences between coun-
tries in terms of cost per tonne of CO2 exported. Reaching agreement on such liberalisation
may be politically challenging, since the payoffs are shown to be strongly divergent across
countries.
The paper is structured as follows. First, Sect. 2 describes the potential structure and
extent of a trans-European CO2 transport network, and the benefits obtained from inter-
national coordination. Section 3 describes our game-theoretic solution concept. Section 4
applies this solution concept to CO2 infrastructure negotiations, under two scenarios: one
scenario with national CO2 transport monopolies, and one scenario with liberalised pipeline
construction. Section 5 contains an extensive set of sensitivity analyses. Section 6 summarises
our conclusions.
2 International Coordination of CO2 Pipeline Networks
The starting point of our investigation is a projection of the optimal CO2 pipeline network in
Europe in 2050. We assume that the European power system evolves according to the Power
Choices scenario (Eurelectric 2010).2 The Power Choices scenario, which is based on the
PRIMES model, is chosen for this purpose because it is in line with the EU’s 80–95 % green-
house gas emissions reductions targets by 2050 (implying near-complete decarbonisation of
the power sector), and hence provides a view on large-scale pan-European deployment of
CCS in the power sector. The scenario implies a reduction of CO2 emissions from the power
sector to 150 Mt/y by 2050, compared to 1,423 Mt/y in 2005. This is achieved through more
than 40 % electricity production from renewable energy sources, close to 30 % of nuclear
power, and the remaining 30 % from fossil fuels. The latter entails the construction of 63 GW
of CCS-equipped coal and gas power stations by 2030 and an additional 128 GW between
2030 and 2050.
Since the Power Choices report by Eurelectric (2010) provides the amount of CCS only
at aggregate European level, we need to make an assumption on how this breaks down
to individual countries. First, we assume that CO2 capture deployment is limited to the 18
countries in which CCS takes places in the EU’s Baseline 2009 scenario (Capros et al. 2010).
Second, we assume that the aggregate European level of CCS (as obtained from the Power
Choices scenarios) is distributed between countries in proportion to current CO2 emissions
from the power sector, as obtained from E-PRTR (2010). Third, within each country, the
amount of CCS is distributed between various industrial ‘clusters’. Further details about the
clustering approach can be found in Morbee et al. (2012). Size and location of potential
CO2 storage sites (depleted hydrocarbon fields and saline aquifers) is obtained from the
EU GeoCapacity project (Vangkilde-Pedersen et al. 2009). Due to technical uncertainty
and public acceptance issues, onshore saline aquifers are excluded as potential CO2 storage
2 Ideally, the amount of CCS-based electricity production per country should be determined simultaneously
with the optimisation of the CO2 network, as in the least cost theory of industrial location (see e.g. Weber 1909).
In such a model the location of CCS-based power plants would depend on the spatial distribution of electricity
demand, coal transport costs, and the CO2 pipeline network construction costs. This, however, would lead to
severe computational challenges. As discussed later in Sect. 4 the problem is already very challenging from a
computational complexity point of view, even when an exogenous scenario for CCS deployment is taken.
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Table 1 CO2 capture rates and
storage potential assumed in this
study
Country Annual CO2
captured
Annual CO2 storage
potential
Mt/y (2050) Mt/y (2050)
Austria 8
Belgium 30
Bulgaria 25
Czech Republic 62
Denmark 15 14
France 27 17
Germany 337 111
Hungary 17 9
Italy 89 61
Netherlands 52 40
Norway 636
Poland 147 17
Portugal 17
Romania 43 88
Slovakia 16
Slovenia 6
Spain 80 108
United Kingdom 173 315
Total 1,145 1,416
sites.3 Details about the assumptions can be found in Morbee et al. (2012). Table 1 provides
an overview of the assumed annual amounts of CO2 captured in each of the countries, as well
as the annual CO2 storage capacity. CCS activities in Finland have been left out of this picture:
since they are geographically far away from the CO2 network in the rest of Europe, they do
not contribute to the negotiation game described in the remainder of the paper. Leaving out
Finland from the start reduces computational complexity of the Shapley value approach by
an order of magnitude.
3 Furthermore, Bentham and Kirby (2005) mention that “In many European Union countries for example
France and Germany, saline aquifers are used for natural gas storage. This may be in direct conflict of interest
with CO2 storage, especially for onshore closures.” This further supports the assumption of this paper to
exclude CO2 storage in onshore saline aquifers. With this assumption, the conflict of interest mentioned by
Bentham and Kirby (2005) does not arise. More generally, the total capacity of saline aquifers and hydrocarbon
fields in the EU may significantly exceed the amount needed for natural gas storage. Indeed, unlike natural gas
storage, the permanent storage of CO2 does not require the possibility of withdrawal at a later stage, which
expands the range of suitable reservoirs. For example, for France and Germany, the above-mentioned EU
GeoCapacity project estimates storage potentials of 8.7 and 17.1 Gt respectively. Using a very approximative
rule of thumb that the volume required to store 2 tonnes of CO2 corresponds roughly to the volume required
to store a thousand cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas, the equivalent natural gas storage potential is 4,300
and 8,500 bcm (billion cubic meters) for France and Germany, respectively. The total volume of current
natural gas storage sites, on the other hand, is 12.7 and 20.4 bcm, respectively, according to GIE (2012).
Hence, the CO2 storage potential seems to exceed the needs for natural gas storage by multiple orders of
magnitude. Obviously, both the EU GeoCapacity estimates and the rough calculations here are subject to large
uncertainties, but it seems safe to assume for the purposes of this paper that CO2 storage does not interfere
with natural gas storage. Nevertheless, the sensitivity analyses in Sect. 5 also address the issue of competition
for storage sites from the natural gas industry.
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Fig. 1 CO2 pipeline network in 2050, assuming joint international optimisation. Total amount of CO2 captured
and stored: 1,145 Mt/y
We use the InfraCCS model to compute the optimal CO2 pipeline network in 2050 for the
given configuration of sources and sinks. InfraCCS is a cost-minimising mixed-integer linear
programming model, which takes into account the scale effects of pipelines (see Morbee et
al. 2012 for more details4). The resulting optimal network is shown in Fig. 1. The network
consists of 11,001 km of pipelines, which transport 1,145 Mt/y of captured CO2 from sources
to sinks. The total investment required is 28.0 billion euro. The network in Fig. 1 assumes
joint international optimisation. If, by contrast, countries develop networks individually, the
resulting pipeline construction would be as in Fig. 2. Since not all countries have sufficient
4 In particular, the cost function used in the InfraCCS model takes into account the full costs of pipeline
ownership, including e.g. obtaining the right-of-way, permitting, labour, materials, pumping stations, and
costs due to pipeline ruptures or other accidental releases during temporary storage.
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Fig. 2 CO2 pipeline network in 2050, assuming individual optimisation per country, without international
cooperation. Total amount of CO2 captured and stored: 565 Mt/y
storage potential, not all captured CO2 projected in the Power Choices scenario can be stored.
In total, in the network in Fig. 2, only 565 Mt/y of CO2 is transported and stored, i.e. less
than half of the amount stored under joint international optimisation (Fig. 1). Non-stored
CO2 can be recognised in the figure as white circles that are not connected with any pipeline.
The network in Fig. 2 is 5,097 km in length and costs 6.4 billion euro.
Thus, the benefits of international cooperation are that an additional 580 Mt/y of CO2 can
be captured and stored compared to individual country action, albeit at the cost of a more
expensive network. In order to translate the benefits of international cooperation into a single
total quantity, we need to make an assumption about the cost of the outside option for the 580
Mt/y of CO2 that cannot be stored in the non-cooperative case. Clearly, this cost should be
lower than the assumed CO2 emissions allowance price in the EU Emissions Trading System
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(EU ETS), since the fact that the CO2 cannot be stored also saves the cost of capturing it
in the first place. The description of the PRIMES model in Eurelectric (2010) states that
the assumed CO2 transport and storage cost ranges from 6 to 25 euro per tonne of CO2 .
Assuming that (i) the lower bound of the range refers to a situation with only storage costs
and no transport costs (i.e. storage very close to the capture site) and (ii) CO2 storage costs are
constant and geographically uniform, we infer that the transport cost in the Power Choices
scenario ranges from 0 to 19 euro per tonne of CO2 . Hence, if transport costs exceed 19 euros
per tonne of CO2 , the PRIMES model will switch technologies and the required emissions
reduction will be realised through other means (e.g. wind energy). We therefore assume in
our analysis the availability of an ‘outside option’ that costs 19 euros per tonne of CO2 .5
For the sake of simplicity we apply this value uniformly across all countries.6 Assuming
a 7.5 % discount rate7 and a 10-year horizon, the cost of not being able to capture and store
580 Mt/y is 75.7 billion euro. Combined with the investment of 6.4 billion euro, the total cost
of the non-cooperative case is therefore 82.1 billion euro, compared with 28.0 billion euro
in the cooperative case. In this setting, the benefits of international cooperation are therefore
54.1 billion euro.
The question addressed in this paper is how these benefits can be allocated between
participating countries in order to ensure cooperation. Equivalently, the question is how to
allocate the cost burden of the 28.0 billion euro investment.
3 Bargaining Power in Multilateral Cooperation: The Shapley Value
The allocation of benefits between participating countries depends on each country’s bar-
gaining power. In the context of this analysis, bargaining power is mainly associated with
two types of rents:
Storage rent. Countries with excess CO2 storage (i.e. more storage capacity than what is
required to store the amounts of CO2 captured within the country) can offer this capacity to
other countries who are short of CO2 storage capacity. Since the availability of additional
storage capacity reduces the need for recurrence to the outside option (i.e. switching to
an alternative technology at a cost of 19 euro per tonne), it brings about a cost reduction
5 Note that this value is lower than the full CO2 emissions allowance price, which is projected to be 103.2
euro per tonne by 2050 in the scenario under consideration (Eurelectric 2010). Indeed, if a country decides
to pursue the outside option (hence no CCS) it does not need to pay for any other CCS-related costs, such as
the CO2 capture costs, or the residual allowances for non-captured CO2 . These cost savings, together with
the 19 euros, pay for the outside option of 103.2 euro per tonne. Since the negotiation takes place about the
long term, it should be emphasised that the outside option does not mean that CO2 would be captured and
subsequently released into the atmosphere. If that were the case, the outside option would cost the full 103.2
euro per tonne, since an emission allowance would have to be bought for each tonne of CO2 released, plus the
capture costs—including the energy consumption penalty of the capture process—plus any additional costs
such as the costs of pipeline leakages due to changes in pressure. The cost of the outside option would be
much higher than the 19 euro per tonne considered here. Put otherwise: in 2050 the value of CO2 emissions
reduction will be 103.2 euro per tonne. Of this amount, only 19 euro per tonne is available for CCS transport,
because enough ‘budget’ needs to be available for capture and other CCS costs. If the transport cost is higher
than 19 euro per tonne, then CCS becomes uncompetitive and society switches to alternative ways of reducing
CO2 emissions such as wind energy.
6 Section 5 contains extensive sensitivity analysis regarding this assumption.
7 This value is the same as the value used for previous InfraCCS simulations (see Morbee et al. 2012). The
value is midway between the rate of around 5 % suggested for cost-benefit analysis of European regional
investment projects (Florio 2008) and typical industrial discount rates for this type of investments (around
10 %).
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for the coalition partners of a country with excess storage. This increases the bargaining
power of countries with excess storage, and allows them to obtain a ‘storage rent’.
Transit rent. Some countries have a strategic location, which allows for shortcuts
between CO2 sources and storage sites. For example, in Fig. 1, the participation of Den-
mark allows for a near-straight pipeline from Poland to Norway. Non-participation of
Denmark would require a detour of the pipeline and hence a higher construction cost. This
translates into bargaining power for transit countries, allowing them to obtain a ‘transit
rent’. This is in fact the reverse of the well-known Jepma-effect in international transport
networks. The Jepma-effect, first described by Jepma (2001) in the context of liberali-
sation of the Dutch natural gas transport network, is the observation that gas transport
tariff differences between neighbouring countries may incentivise gas shippers to reroute
gas flows in order to take advantage of a cheaper neighbouring network, even if the new
route is inefficient from a technical perspective. The CO2 pipeline transit rent described
in this paper is essentially the same effect but in the opposite direction: a country with
an advantageous transit location may be incentivised to increase CO2 transport tariffs
because it would be even more costly for foreign CO2 shippers to reroute CO2 flows in
order to circumvent the country.
To assess these storage and transit rents in an integrated way, we apply the Shapley value
approach, introduced by Shapley (1953). The Shapley value defines a ‘fair’ allocation of the
benefits of cooperation, taking into account the contributions of each of the players. It defines
the only allocation that satisfies a set of desirable properties (individual fairness, efficiency,
symmetry, additivity and zero-player property). Starting from a set N of n players (in this
case: countries), we define the function v : P(N ) → R, such that, for every subset S of N ,
v(S) is the payoff of a cooperation among the countries in S. According to the Shapley value,
the amount of benefit received by player i ∈ N is:
φi =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n − |S| − 1)!
n! (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) (1)
The sum is computed over all possible coalitions of players. For each coalition, Eq. (1)
computes the difference (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) between the payoff of the coalition with and
without player i . The Shapley value φi is then a weighted average of those values. Intuitively,
the formula computes the contribution added by player i to the ‘grand coalition’ (the coalition
of all players) averaged over all possible sequences in which this grand coalition can be
formed. As an example, we compute (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) for the subset S that includes all
countries except Denmark. i is Denmark. For this case we have S∪{i} = N , hence the payoff
v(S ∪ {i}) is the cost of the fully cooperative CO2 network from Fig. 1, i.e. 28.0 billion euro.
The payoff v(S) can be determined by running the InfraCCS tool without Denmark. This is
shown in Fig. 3. The cost of this network is 32.1 billion euro. Hence, by including Denmark
in the coalition, there is a cost saving of 4.1 billion euro, because the participation Denmark
permits more efficient routing of pipelines from central Europe to Norway. Furthermore,
the inclusion of Denmark in the coalition offers cost savings in Denmark itself, because by
participating, Denmark does not have to build its own small network, which would cost 0.6
billion euro. In addition, the inclusion of Denmark offers a solution for the 1.6 Mt/y that
Denmark would not be able to store domestically (which would cost 0.2 billion euro in order
to pay for the NPV of the outside option of 19 euros per tonne). In total, the contribution
(v(S∪{i})−v(S))of Denmark to the coalition S is therefore 4.9 billion euro. This computation
is done for all possible subsets S of N and all players i . Equation (1) requires a total of 262,143
runs of the above-mentioned InfraCCS model.
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Fig. 3 CO2 pipeline network in 2050, assuming joint international optimisation without participation of
Denmark
In addition to the computational complexity—which will be discussed in Sect. 4—the
Shapley value has a number of other disadvantages. Intuitively, since the Shapley value is
an average over all possible sequences, it implicitly assumes that all sequences are equally
likely, which is unappealing. Futhermore, the Shapley value assumes that all players have the
same perfect information about the benefits of forming the grand coalition, which may not
necessarily be the case. However, from the perspective of cooperative game theory, one of
the most important drawbacks of the Shapley value is that the solution is not necessarily part
of the ‘core’, the set of allocations for which no coalition has a value greater than the sum
of its members’ payoffs. Shapley (1971) proves that the Shapley value is part of the core for
convex games. However, in this paper the mixed-integer model required for accurate pipeline
network optimisation may lead to some non-convexities. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the
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introduction the Shapley value is a proven concept for network cost allocation, hence the
application to the case of CO2 pipeline networks seems justified.
In the introduction, it was mentioned that CCS currently suffers from lack of public accep-
tance. For instance, a project funded by the UK Department of Trade and Industry (Wright
et al. 2007) found that the general public in Europe has a very negative opinion about the
risks and safety issues arising from CCS programmes. This may affect countries’ bargaining
position. Negative public perception of CCS has the effect of increasing the political cost of
implementing CCS. In the set-up of the current paper, this is mathematically equivalent to a
decrease in the cost of the outside option. Indeed, as public perception of CCS becomes more
negative, the relative willingness to pay for alternatives (e.g. wind energy) increases, hence
their cost decreases. Therefore, in order to assess the effect of public acceptance issues on
the negotiations, Sect. 5 contains a number of sensitivity analyses that examine the impact
of changes in the cost of the outside option.
Likewise, it could be argued that the multilateral negotiation may be affected by a potential
conflict of interest in the subsurface, where CO2 storage could interfere with oil and gas
production (see e.g. Bentham and Kirby 2005). As will be argued at the end of Sect. 4,
the resource rents that are obtained from hydrocarbon production are far larger than the
rents that can be obtained from CO2 storage. It is therefore very likely that oil and gas
production always gets preference over CO2 storage. Therefore the EU GeoCapacity project,
from which the CO2 storage capacity estimates are used in this paper, focuses on depleted
hydrocarbon fields. Indeed, the storage sites identified in the project are mostly located
in mature oil and gas provinces, or provinces that will certainly be depleted at the time
horizon required for the implementation of CCS. One exception to this is the North Sea area.
However, this province is so large that CO2 storage could start in the many fields that are
already depleted and later expand to other fields as and when they too become depleted.
In addition to a potential conflict of interest, there are also potential synergies between
CO2 storage and the oil and gas industry, since CO2 injection can be used for Enhanced
Oil Recovery (EOR) or Enhanced Gas Recovery (EGR) from mature fields. The conflict of
interest between CO2 storage and the oil and gas industry can be modelled in this multilateral
negotiation game through a higher CO2 storage cost, since the opportunity cost of using
the field for CO2 storage (and hence affecting its use for oil and gas extraction) is higher.
The potential synergies between CO2 storage and the oil and gas industry can be modelled
through a lower CO2 storage cost, since the additional revenues from enhanced hydrocarbon
production may create a willingness to pay for the CO2 , which offsets part of the storage costs.
Sensitivity analyses using both higher and lower storage costs are therefore performed in
Sect. 5.
4 Simulations
4.1 Set-up
In this section, we apply the Shapley value to the issue of European multilateral CO2 pipeline
infrastructure negotiations. The realisation of the network of Fig. 1 requires cooperation
among n = 18 countries: 17 source countries within the EU,8 plus Norway. When applying
Eq. (1), we distinguish two cases:
8 As mentioned before, Finland has been omitted from the set of 18 countries active in CCS according to the
simulations by Capros et al. (2010).
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Case 1: National CO2 pipeline monopolies. In this case, we assume that every country
has a monopoly on CO2 pipeline construction within its territory. As a result, a pipeline
through a given country cannot be built by a coalition that does not include this country.
Case 2: Liberalised CO2 pipeline construction. In this case, any country is free to build
pipelines in the entire EU and Norway. This does not mean however, that the land on
which these pipelines are constructed is free: a cost to cover the right-of-way is included
in the pipeline costing approach embedded in the InfraCCS model.
Note that in both cases, CO2 cannot be stored in a given country by a coalition that does not
include that country.
We compute the Shapley value for both cases, which, as mentioned above, requires the
computation of the pay-offs of 262,143 coalitions in each case. This is a computational
challenge, because each pipeline optimisation problem is a mixed-integer problem (MIP),
which is NP-hard to solve, i.e. no efficient algorithms for such problems exist today. In
Case 1, due to national pipeline monopolies, many coalitions can be broken down into
independent contiguous subsets. As a result, Case 1 requires the computation of the pay-offs
of only 26,922 contiguous coalitions, which can then be combined to obtain the results for
all 262,143 coalitions. Hence, in Case 1 the number of runs of the InfraCCS model can be
reduced by almost a factor 10. In Case 2 however, all coalitions need to be run with the
InfraCCS model.9
4.2 Results: Shapley Value
Table 2 shows the resulting Shapley values in both cases. The Shapley value is shown both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total. These Shapley values show how the 54.1
billion euro benefit from international cooperation can be allocated between countries. In
Case 1, large rents are allocated to Norway and the UK, which are the main net storage
providers in this analysis (see Table 1). In total, the net storage providers capture 38 % of
the benefits. A large rent is also allocated to Denmark, which plays a crucial role as transit
country in Fig. 1. The large Shapley value for Germany is related to the fact that it contributes
the most CO2 , which allows for avoiding a large ‘outside option’ cost.
In Case 2, the rents shift more towards the largest storage provider, i.e. Norway. In total,
net storage providers capture 45 % of the benefits in this case. Due to the liberalisation of
pipeline construction, Denmark loses most of its Shapley value, which demonstrates indeed
that its bargaining power in Case 1 can be attributed to its transit position. Likewise, one
notes that Germany’s bargaining power decreases between Case 1 and Case 2, which points
to the fact that a portion of its bargaining power in Case 1 is due to its central location in
Europe, which allows it to serve as a hub for CO2 transport. Finally, note that Poland gains
significantly in the transition from Case 1 to Case 2: indeed, since Poland is at the end of the
pipeline network, it does not have an advantageous transit position and therefore stands to
gain from pipeline liberalisation.
The last column in Table 2 shows how the Shapley value changes from Case 1 to Case 2
for each country. A negative value means that a country loses benefits in the event of pipeline
liberalisation. A negative value is therefore a measure of the transit rent obtained by each
country in Case 1. The abolute value of the sum of all negative values, i.e. the total transit
rent in Case 1, is 10.1 billion euro, which represents 19 % of the total benefits.
9 For that reason, the MIP computation time is deliberately capped at 3 min per coalition in Case 1, and 3 s in
Case 2. In total, the computation takes about a week on a standard computer.
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Table 2 Shapley value allocation for the coalitional game described in Sect. 2
Country Shapley value
Case 1 Case 2 Difference
Case 2–Case 1
Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR
Austria 0.4 1 0.4 1 0.0
Belgium 1.8 3 1.7 3 −0.1
Bulgaria 1.0 2 1.1 2 0.1
Czech Republic 1.8 3 3.3 6 1.5
Denmark 4.5 8 0.3 1 −4.2
France 1.4 3 0.6 1 −0.8
Germany 14.1 26 11.9 22 −2.2
Hungary 1.0 2 0.5 1 −0.6
Italy 0.9 2 1.0 2 0.1
Netherlands 1.4 3 0.7 1 −0.7
Norway 11.7 22 16.6 31 4.9
Poland 3.5 7 6.5 12 3.0
Portugal 0.6 1 0.7 1 0.1
Romania 2.2 4 2.4 4 0.2
Slovakia 0.6 1 0.8 2 0.2
Slovenia 0.5 1 0.2 0 −0.2
Spain 1.2 2 1.2 2 0.0
United Kingdom 5.4 10 4.0 7 −1.4
Total 54.1 100 54.1 100
The last column can also be interpreted as each country’s payoff from EU legislation that
would liberalise CO2 pipeline construction. For some countries this payoff is positive while
for others it is negative, hence this column indicates which countries are likely to lobby for
EU legislation that liberalises CO2 pipeline construction and which countries are likely to
oppose it. First, countries that have bargaining power mostly because of their storage capac-
ity and not because of their transit location are likely to advocate pipeline liberalisation. For
example, Norway and to some extent Romania are likely to be proponents of liberalisation:
they can gain 4.9 and 0.2 billion euro respectively. Second, countries with difficult access
to the main storage sites in the North Sea are also likely to be proponents of liberalisation.
For example, liberalisation may bring Poland and the Czech Republic gains of 3.0 and 1.5
billion euro respectively, because liberalisation would reduce the transit rents that Denmark
and Germany obtain for transporting CO2 to the North Sea. Third, countries with advanta-
geous transit locations are likely to oppose liberalisation of CO2 pipeline construction. For
example, Denmark and Germany would lose 4.2 and 2.2 billion euro, respectively. Fourth,
for several countries such as Italy the difference between Case 1 and Case 2 is small or
insignificant, which means that they are likely to have a neutral stance regarding liberalisa-
tion of CO2 pipeline construction. Note that this does not mean that they would be indifferent
between participating and not participating in the coalition. Indeed, for example Italy gains
around 1 billion euro from participating in the coalition, both in Case 1 and in Case 2. Hence
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in both cases there is a strong incentive for Italy to participate in the coalition. The small dif-
ference between Case 1 and Case 2 merely illustrates that Italy would be likely to be neutral
regarding the liberalisation question (with a slight preference in favour of liberalisation). All
in all, the payoffs in the last column show that 10 countries would benefit to a smaller or
larger extent from liberalisation, while 8 countries would lose. In such a divided landscape
it will probably be challenging to reach a political compromise on liberalisation.
An interesting additional question is what would happen in the event another nearby
country wants to join the coalition once the network is already in place. As in the game
described in this paper, the entrant country would have to negotiate access to pipelines and
storage sites in the coalition countries. Under the assumptions of this paper, the existing
network is right-sized and does not have any spare capacity to accommodate new flows.10
Hence, new pipelines will have to be built specifically for CO2 flows of the entrant country.
The result of the negotiation can be computed using the same methodology as used in this
paper. The entrant country will negotiate with all existing countries, in order to form the grand
coalition that brings CO2 from the entrant country to a storage site in the most efficient way.
The benefits will be divided among storage countries, transit countries and the entrant country
in the same way as before, i.e. in proportion to the extent to which a country is indispensable
in the CO2 chain. The same two cases can be distinguished. In Case 1, large rents may go
to the transit countries. In Case 2, a larger rent will be allocated to the storage country. In
any case, a large part of the rent will be allocated to the entrant country, since without its
participation there are no gains at all. Clearly, since the existing players will not accept to
be worse off, the entrant country will have to pay at least for all new pipeline investments
and storage costs. In addition the entrant country will pay a premium (rent) to the existing
players. The rent will be such that the entrant country is still better off than when it acts
alone. The size of the premium depends on the extent to which various alternatives routings
of the entrant’s CO2 flow are available, which will have the effect of diluting the bargaining
power of existing players. Besides the above-mentioned Cases 1 and 2, there is a potentially
interesting Case 3: if existing players managed to form a cartel against the entrant, then the
game would cease to be a multilateral game, and become a bilateral game between the entrant
and the cartel. The Shapley value would then degenerate to the Nash bargaining solution, in
which the benefits of cooperation would be split equally between the entrant and the cartel.
4.3 Results: Cost Allocation
Table 3 translates the Shapley values from Table 2 into the allocation of the cost burden
of the network. As mentioned in Sect. 2, the total required investment in the CO2 pipeline
network is 28.0 billion euro. Table 3 shows how this cost of 28.0 billion euro is shared
between individual countries. Note that some countries make a net payment, while others are
net recipients from the cooperation. A large share of the cost is borne by countries with large
volumes of excess CO2 , such as Germany and Poland. Due to reasons mentioned before,
Germany contributes more in Case 2 than in Case 1, while Poland contributes less. Note that
Denmark is a net recipient in Case 1, while it is a net contributor in Case 2.
4.4 Results: Export and Import Prices
Finally it is possible to translate the Shapley values into prices expressed per tonne of
CO2 stored. For this purpose, we first compute—for each country—the additional investment
10 For a discussion on potential oversizing of a European CO2 pipeline network in anticipation of future flows,
see Morbee et al. (2012).
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Table 3 Investment cost burden sharing for the CO2 pipeline network shown in Fig. 1
Country Shapley value
Case 1 Case 2 Difference
Case 2–Case 1
Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR Percent Bn EUR
Austria 0.6 2 0.6 2 0.0
Belgium 2.1 8 2.2 8 0.1
Bulgaria 2.2 8 2.1 7 −0.1
Czech Republic 6.3 22 4.8 17 −1.5
Denmark −3.7 −13 0.5 2 4.2
France 0.5 2 1.3 5 0.8
Germany 16.3 58 18.5 66 2.2
Hungary 0.2 1 0.8 3 0.6
Italy 3.3 12 3.2 12 −0.1
Netherlands 0.5 2 1.2 4 0.7
Norway −11.7 −42 −16.6 −59 −4.9
Poland 13.8 49 10.8 38 −3.0
Portugal 1.6 6 1.5 6 −0.1
Romania −1.9 −7 −2.1 −8 −0.2
Slovakia 1.5 5 1.3 5 −0.2
Slovenia 0.3 1 0.5 2 0.2
Spain −0.1 0 −0.1 0 0.0
United Kingdom −3.8 −14 −2.4 −9 1.4
Total 28.0 100 28.0 100
made when going from the non-cooperative case (Fig. 2) to the cooperative case (Fig. 1),
i.e. the value from Table 3 minus the domestic pipeline investments made to realise the net-
work of Fig. 2. Secondly, we divide this number by the additional amount of CO2 captured
in this country in the cooperative case compared to the non-cooperative case.11 Obviously,
this computation is meaningful only for net CO2 exporters. The results of the countries with
the highest cost per tonne of CO2 exported are shown in Table 4. One immediately observes
that the spread of costs is much smaller in Case 2 than in Case 1. Indeed, in Case 1 there is
much more heterogeneity between countries, depending on their transit position. In Case 2,
differentiation between counties is mostly due to their distance from the main storage sites.
The range of costs is reduced from over 15 euro per tonne in Case 1, to less than 5 euro per
tonne in Case 2. Note that e.g. Slovenia, although located far away from the North Sea, pays
a rather low price in Case 1, due to its role as a transit country for Italy. In Case 2 however,
this advantage disappears and it ranks as one of the higher-cost countries.
A similar analysis can be done for countries that are net importers of CO2 . As above,
we divide the difference in cashflow (when going from the non-cooperative case to the
cooperative case) by the amount of CO2 imported, with discounting as above. The results
are in Table 5. We observe that in Case 1, the revenue per tonne of CO2 imported and stored
ranges from 3.9 to 10.0 euro per tonne of CO2 , with a weighted average of 5.1 euro per
11 As before, discounting at 7.5 % is performed and a 10-year time horizon is assumed.
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Table 4 Costs per tonne
of CO2 exported (in EUR
per tonne of CO2 )
Case 1 Case 2
Country Cost Country Cost
Poland 15.0 Italy 13.9
Czech Republic 14.7 Portugal 13.1
Italy 14.3 Slovenia 12.8
Portugal 13.7 Bulgaria 12.3
Slovakia 13.5 Poland 11.7
Bulgaria 13.1 Austria 11.6
Austria 11.3 Hungary 11.6
Belgium 10.2 Slovakia 11.6
Germany 9.9 Germany 11.3
Slovenia 7.4 Czech Republic 11.2
Hungary 2.3 France 11.0
Netherlands 1.1 Belgium 10.7
France −0.3 Netherlands 9.4
Table 5 Revenue per tonne
of CO2 imported and stored
(in EUR per tonne of CO2 )
Case 1 Case 2
Country Revenue Country Revenue
Spain 10.0 Spain 10.1
United Kingdom 8.5 Romania 8.6
Romania 7.9 United Kingdom 6.3
Norway 3.9 Norway 5.6
Weighted average 5.1 Weighted average 6.0
tonne. In Case 2, with liberalised pipeline construction, the average revenue increases to 6.0
euro per tonne. Revenues increase especially for countries with little transit role (Norway,
Romania).
As a side-effect of the results of Table 5, we can compute an estimate of the resource rent
associated with a depleted hydrocarbon field that is to be used for CO2 storage. As a very
approximative rule of thumb, a depleted oil field can store roughly 1 tonne of CO2 per tonne
of original recoverable oil reserves. The resource rent of 5–6 euro per tonne of CO2 stored
therefore corresponds to approximately $1 per barrel of original recoverable oil reserves. This
is clearly far below the resource rent that was originally obtained from oil extraction. For gas
fields, the results are more favourable. As a very approximative rule of thumb, a depleted gas
field can store roughly 2 tonnes of CO2 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) of gas in its original
recoverable reserves. The resource rent of 5–6 euro per tonne of CO2 stored therefore corre-
sponds to approximately 1 euro per MWh of gas, i.e. around $2 per barrel of oil equivalent.
This is roughly 5 % of the wholesale price of natural gas: e.g. the average German import
border price was 20 euro per MWh in 2010 according to BAFA (2011). Overall, therefore, it
seems that the rent is relatively small from the perspective of petroleum economics. However,
it is relatively large from the perspective of CCS economics. Indeed, typical storage costs are
estimated to be 1–20 euro per tonne of CO2 stored depending on such factors as the type of
storage site (hydrocarbon field or aquifer), the location (onshore/offshore) and the presence
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of re-usable legacy wells (see e.g. ZEP 2011). The rent of 5–6 euro per tonne of CO2 needs
to be added to this number, and represents an increase of 25–600 % of the costs.
5 Sensitivity Analyses
As described in Sect. 2 the analysis in this paper assumes that the both the cost of storage
and the cost of the outside option are (i) constant, and (ii) uniform across all countries. In
this section we perform a sensitivity analysis on those assumptions to check the robustness
of the results.
5.1 Uniform Changes in Costs of Storage and Outside Option
Until now, we have assumed that all countries have an outside option that costs 19 euro
per tonne of CO2 . Furthermore, since storage costs were assumed to be uniform across all
countries, there was no mathematical need to include storage costs in the model. This does not
mean that no storage cost is paid. As mentioned in Sect. 2, the PRIMES storage cost of 6 euro
per tonne had already been subtracted from the outside option. So, another mathematically
equivalent way of looking at the results of this paper, is that all countries producing CO2 need
to pay a fixed storage fee of 6 euro per tonne, while the cost of the outside option is increased
from 19 to 25 euro per tonne. The results would be identical. Therefore, in the model in
this paper the effect of a uniform increase in the storage cost is identical to the effect of a
uniform decrease in the cost of the outside option. Intuitively, both have the same effect of
reducing the available ‘budget’ for CO2 transport, thereby affecting the negotiation margin
of the CO2 source countries and hence the rents of the transit and storage countries.
An increase in storage cost could be the result of more stringent regulation of safety and
security of CO2 storage reservoirs. It could also result from competition with natural gas
storage, which typically makes use of the same types of reservoirs in depleted hydrocarbon
fields or saline aquifers. In non-mature hydrocarbon provinces there could also be competi-
tion with ongoing oil and gas extraction activities. Competition with natural gas storage or
with hydrocarbon extraction would increase the opportunity cost of using the reservoir for
CO2 storage as opposed to using it for other purposes. This would raise the storage cost. On
the other hand, if CO2 can be injected into hydrocarbon fields for the purpose of EOR or EGR,
this would lead to additional oil or gas revenues, which would create a willingness-to-pay
for CO2 that would offset the storage costs. Synergies between CO2 storage and EOR/EGR
could therefore lead to a decrease in CO2 storage costs. ZEP (2011) estimates CO2 storage
costs to be in the range of 1–20 euro per tonne. When excluding the most expensive types of
storage (i.e. offshore reservoirs without legacy wells) the range is reduced from 1 to 12 euro
per tonne. Therefore, in this sensitivity analysis we choose to use a [−5,+5] range around
the initially assumed storage cost of 6 euro per tonne.
Applying this sensitivity range to the storage cost is equivalent to applying an opposite
[+5,−5] sensitivity range to the cost of the outside option. A decrease in the cost of the
outside option could be the result of technological advances in e.g. wind energy, which
make CCS less competitive as an option to reduce CO2 emissions. Lack of public acceptance
of CCS would also result in higher political costs of CCS, which would have the same
effect of reducing the cost of the outside option because the lack of support for CCS would
increase the relative willingness-to-pay for other emission reduction options such as wind
energy. Conversely, a lack of progress in e.g. costs of offshore wind, or a breakthrough in
CO2 capture technologies would have the effect of increasing the cost of the outside option.
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Fig. 4 Sensitivity analysis on investment cost burden sharing in Case 1. Net payments in billion euro
The effect of these sensitivities on the investment cost burden sharing of Table 3 is shown
in Fig. 4. For the sake of conciseness the results are only shown for Case 1; the effects for
Case 2 are similar. The middle column in the figure corresponds to the cost burden allocation
of Table 3. The column on the left corresponds to the effect of a 5 euro per tonne increase in
storage cost, or—equivalently—a 5 euro per tonne decrease of the cost of the outside option.
Conversely, the column on the right corresponds to the effect of a 5 euro per tonne decrease in
storage cost, or—equivalently—a 5 euro per tonne increase in the cost of the outside option.
The part of the graph above the axis shows the net contributors to the investment, the part
below the axis shows the countries who receive a net payment.
As can be expected, an increase in storage cost or decrease in the cost of the outside
option makes CO2 transport less attractive for the participating source countries, hence they
have to pay less in the negotiation and the rents of the transit and storage countries decrease.
Conversely, a decrease in storage costs or an increase in the cost of the outside option makes
CO2 transport more attractive for the source countries. Part of this value is extracted as a
rent by the transit and storage countries, hence the payments increase. The effect is more
pronounced for some countries than for others. E.g. both Poland and Germany need to pay
around 3 billion euro more in the column on the right, but as a result the relative share of
Poland in the cost burden increases. This is because the decrease in Poland’s bargaining
power (due to the cost change) is not offset by an increase in transit rent (as it is the case in
Germany). Spain is the only country that switches between contributing and receiving: in the
base case it receives a small net payment, while in the column on the left it needs to make
a net contribution. All other countries are always net contributors or always net receivers.
Overall, the relative contributions and main qualitative conclusions seem to remain fairly
stable in this sensitivity analysis.
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Fig. 5 Shapley value of each
storage country (in billion euro,
vertical axis) as a function of a
ceteris-paribus change in its
storage costs (in euro per tonne
of CO2 , horizontal axis)
5.2 Non-uniform Changes in Costs of Storage and Outside Option
The sensitivity analyses in the previous section were applied uniformly to all countries.
However, it may be the case that storage costs or costs of the outside option vary between
countries. Storage cost differences could be caused by different levels of competition with
natural gas storage or with the oil and gas industry, or different availability of EOR/EGR
possibilities. Storage cost differences could also result from quality differences in reservoirs.
Reservoirs of lower quality will require more investments and operating costs to store a given
amount of CO2 , hence per-unit storage costs for lower-quality reservoirs should be expected
to be higher. For example, ZEP (2011) differentiates its CO2 storage cost estimates by type
of storage site (hydrocarbon field or aquifer), location (onshore/offshore) and presence of
re-usable legacy wells. Even when the location is the same, and no legacy wells are present,
the range of storage costs for depleted hydrocarbon fields is slightly lower than for saline
aquifers: for the former the range is 1–10 euro per tonne, while for the latter it is 2–12 euro
per tonne.
Differences in the cost of the outside option could result from different availability of
alternative emission reduction options. E.g. countries with large potential for wind and solar
energy may have a lower outside option cost than others. Differences in the cost of the outside
option could also result from different public perceptions of CCS. If CCS is publicly supported
in one country but opposed in another country, this would result in different political costs
of CCS, with would be equivalent to having different costs of the outside option.
In the previous section, a uniform change in storage costs was mathematically equivalent to
an identical but opposite uniform change in the costs of the outside option. When a change is
non-uniform, this is not the case anymore, hence sensitivity analyses for storage costs and for
costs of the outside option need to be treated separately. To keep the sensitivity analysis simple
and transparent, the analysis is performed on a reduced set of countries. For this purpose, we
choose the set of five countries in the eastern part of Europe that happen to have a separate
network in the grand coalition depicted in Fig. 1: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and
Poland. For Poland, only the depleted hydrocarbon field in the southeast is considered, hence
in this sensitivity analysis it will be negotiating purely as a storage provider. The aim of the
analysis is to determine the effect of individual changes in costs of storage or the outside
option, on the distribution of gains from cooperation according to the Shapley value. For the
sake of simplicity, we consider only the case with national pipeline monopolies.
First, we study the effect of changes in storage costs. We assume a change in the storage
cost of one country and recompute its Shapley value after the change. Figure 5 shows the
evolution of the Shapley value of each of the three storage countries in the set (Hungary,
Poland and Romania) as a function of a negative or positive individual change in its storage
costs. Note that for each of the curves only the country itself is subjected to a change in
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Fig. 6 Shapley value of each
storage country (as % of total
coalition gains, vertical axis) as
a function of a ceteris-paribus
change in its storage costs
(in euro per tonne of CO2 ,
horizontal axis)
Fig. 7 Shapley value of each
source country (in billion euro,
vertical axis) as a function of a
ceteris-paribus change in the cost
of its outside option (in euro per
tonne of CO2 , horizontal axis)
storage costs, while the storage costs of the others remain constant. As can be expected, an
increase in storage cost for Romania and Poland leads to a decrease in their respective Shapley
values, hence a decrease in bargaining power: as their storage becomes more expensive, they
provide less marginal benefits to the grand coalition and hence get a smaller share of the gains
from cooperation. The case of Hungary is counterintuitive, since its Shapley value increases
slightly with increasing storage costs. However, this is mostly because its increased storage
costs are mainly damaging for its own CO2 production. As a result, its marginal contribution
to the coalition increases because by joining the coalition it would not have to store its CO2 in
expensive domestic storages but rather contribute to economies of scale in the joint network.
In addition, the value shown is only the Shapley value: an analysis of Hungary’s net payment
to the investment cost burden shows that its net payment does increase when storage costs in
Hungary go up. It should be noted that the absolute numbers for the Shapley value in Fig. 5
and the following are different from the numbers appearing in Table 2 because the game
considered here is only for the reduced set of countries.12
The decline in Shapley value for Romania as a function of changes in its storage costs in
Fig. 5 seems quite steep. However, the decline is far less steep when considered in relative
terms, i.e. as a percentage of the total gains from cooperation generated by the grand coalition
(the sum of all Shapley values). Figure 6 shows the values from Fig. 5 in those terms. One
can observe that the profiles are fairly flat, meaning that a country’s share of total gains is
relatively stable as a function of its storage cost level.
Next, we study the effects of changes in costs of the outside option. As before, we assume
a change in the cost of the outside option for one country and recompute its Shapley value.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the Shapley value of each of the four source countries in
the set (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) as a function of a negative or positive
12 Nevertheless, one can observe that the Shapley values for Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia in
Figs. 5 and 7 differ only by maximum 0.3 billion euro from those in Table 2, which illustrates the robustness
of the results. The result for Poland is obviously very different since this reduced analyis considers only the
hydrocarbon field in the southeast of Poland and not its CO2 sources.
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Fig. 8 Investment cost burden
of each source country (in billion
euro, vertical axis) as a function
of a ceteris-paribus change in the
cost of its outside option (in euro
per tonne of CO2 , horizontal
axis)
individual change in the cost of its outside option. Again, for each of the curves only the
country itself is subjected to a change in costs, while the costs of the outside option of the
others remain constant. For Romania, the curve is flat, meaning that the cost of its outside
option does not affect its Shapley value. This is fairly obvious since Romania has excess
storage capacity, hence it does not need to rely on its outside option. The results for the
other countries are counterintuitive: their Shapley value increases when the cost of their
outside option increases, while one would expect that their Shapley value would decrease.
The reason is that the Shapley value only shows the distribution of gains from cooperation.
A country’s final result is the sum of what it can do on its own, plus its share of the gains
from cooperation. An increase in the cost of the outside option leads to a sharp decline in the
benefits a country can achieve on its own. This has the relative effect of enlarging the gains
from cooperation, hence enlarging the ‘pie’ to be distributed. On the other hand, the country’s
relative bargaining power is weakened. The net effect is that in the negotiation the country
gets a smaller share of a bigger pie, which turns out to be a net gain in this case. However,
the final effect on the country is still negative, because the net gain in Shapley value does not
offset the decrease in benefits it can achieve on its own. Another way of looking at this is
by checking the net payments that each country makes to the investment cost burden of the
network. This is shown in Fig. 8. Clearly, the net payments increase slightly as a function of
the cost of the outside option.
Overall, it seems that the results of the analysis, especially the relative shares of countries
in the gains from cooperation and the payments for investments, are fairly robust vis-à-vis
uniform and non-uniform changes in storage costs or costs of the outside option.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed bargaining power in the multilateral negotiation process that
would be required to develop a cost-minimising trans-European CO2 transport infrastructure
if CO2 carbon capture and storage is deployed on a large scale by 2050. We apply the Shapley
value to the coalitional game between 18 European countries, in two different cases: one case
with national pipeline monopolies and one case with liberalised pipeline construction. Using
the InfraCCS pipeline optimisation model, we perform a numerical simulation, which com-
putes each country’s contribution to a 28 billion euro trans-European CO2 pipeline network.
First, we find that countries with more storage capacity than capture activity obtain
38–45 % of the benefits of cooperation, with the higher number corresponding to the case
with liberalised pipeline construction. This means that a depleted hydrocarbon field (when
used for CO2 storage) can earn a resource rent of roughly $1 per barrel of original recoverable
oil reserves, or $2 per boe of original recoverable gas reserves. This number is small from the
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perspective of petroleum economics, but corresponds to 5–6 euro per tonne of CO2 stored,
which may increase CO2 storage costs by 25–600 %.
Second, countries with a strategic transit location capture 19 % of the rent in the case of
national pipeline monopolies. EU legislation that liberalises pipeline construction eliminates
this transit rent and reduces by two-thirds the differences between countries in terms of cost
per tonne of CO2 exported. For example, Denmark obtains a net benefit of over 4 billion euro
in the case of national pipeline monopolies, but loses almost all of this if pipeline construction
is liberalised. Since the payoffs from liberalisation are strongly divergent across countries,
reaching a political compromise on such legislation may be challenging.
In a sensitivity analysis the results of this paper, especially the relative shares of countries
in the gains from cooperation and the payments for investments, are shown to be fairly robust
vis-à-vis uniform and non-uniform changes in storage costs or costs of the outside option.
The results are dependent on the assumptions made in the model developed in this paper.
Considering the capture process, it is recognised that carbon allowance prices need to be
set aside against not just storage and transport costs but also against capture costs in CCS
participating countries that resist a power tariff rise. The ratio of capture costs to transport and
storage costs depends on the typology of capture technology used. Regarding the bargaining
process, it is clear that countries’ bargaining position in negotiations is also conditioned by
perceived risks of CO2 transport and storage in certain national contexts. More generally, the
results are obviously strongly dependent on the assumptions underlying the Shapley value.
Other approaches exist, and the allocation shown in this paper is not necessarily the only
possible allocation. Even more importantly, the cooperative game theory framework from
which the Shapley value arises, assumes that the grand coalition is eventually formed. This is
in stark contrast with current developments in Europe: unlike the US, there is no CO2 pipeline
network in Europe yet, and many countries would oppose such developments. As a further
caveat, it should be mentioned that the rent computed here is only the rent arising from market
power in CO2 transport. In addition there may be a Hotelling (1931) rent for storage sites
if storage becomes scarce. Furthermore, supranational regulation and enforcement may be
required in order to avoid renegotiation once the network is in place.13 More generally, there is
a question about which market organisation would be suited for the operation of such a jointly
optimal network. Finally, an important area for future work is a more thorough understanding
of the ‘outside option’ through better integration with the economic equilibrium models that
generate the scenarios of CO2 capture rates.
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